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Abstract 
AI planning algorithms have addressed the 
problem of generating sequences of oper­
ators that achieve some input goal, usu­
ally assuming that the planning agent has 
perfect control over and information about 
the world.  Relaxing these assumptions re­
quires an extension to the action represen­
tation that allows reasoning both about the 
changes an action makes and the information 
it provides. This paper presents an action 
representation that extends the determinis­
tic STRIPS model, allowing actions to have 
both causal and informational effects, both of 
which can be context dependent and noisy. 
We also demonstrate how a standard least­
commitment planning algorithm can be ex­
tended to include informational actions and 
contingent execution. 
1 Introduction 
The ability to reason with incomplete information, to 
gather needed information, and to exploit that infor­
mation in a plan is essential to building agents that can 
perform competently in realistic domains. Research in 
AI planning has yielded al gorithms for plan genera­
tion, but mainly under assumptions that the agent has 
perfect information about and control over the world. 
The decision sciences have developed techniques for 
representing sources of uncertainty: incomp lete infor­
mation can be viewed as a probability distribution over 
world states, and conditional probabilities can repre­
sent the changes effected by executing an action as 
well as information gathered during action execution. 
This formalism provides us with methods for evaluat­
ing plans, but does not help us to generate them . 
This paper integrates the two lines of work: we present 
a representation for actions , plans, and information 
based on a standard probab ilistic interpretat.ion of 
uncertainty, but one that can also can be manipu­
lated by a subgoaling plan-generation algorithm. The 
framework allows the representation of information­
producing actions (also known as "tests" or "diag­
nostics"). A standard least-commitment AI planning 
algorithm is extended to use this probabilistic repre­
sentation , and further to support contingency plans­
plans in which the execution of steps can depend on 
information provided by previous diagnostic actions. 
In this paper we will concentrate on the representation 
for actions and plans, referring the reader to (Draper 
et a/., I 994] for a more detailed description oft he plan­
ning algorithm. 
1.1 Example 
We begin by posing a simple example that demon­
strates the need for reasoning about information, plan­
ning to gather information, and acting based on that 
information. 
A robot is given the task of processing a widget. Its 
goal is to have the widget painted (PA) and processed 
(PR) and finally notifying its supervisor that it is done 
(NO). Processing the widget consists of i dentifying 
it as either flawed (FL) or not flawed (IT), then re­
jecting or shipping the widget (reject or ship), respec­
tively. The robot also has an operator paint that usu­
ally makes PA true. 
Although the robot cannot immediately tell whether 
or not the widget is flawed, it does have an operator 
inspect that tells it whether the widget is blemished 
(BL). The sensor usually reports bad if the widget is 
blemished, and ok if not. Initially any widget that is 
flawed is also blemished . But two things complicate 
the sensing process: 
• Painting the widget removes a blemish but not 
a flaw, so executing inspect after the widget 
has been painted conveys no information about 
whether or not it is flawed. 
• The sensor is sometimes wrong: if the widget is 
blemished then 90% of the time the sensor will re­
port bad, but 10% of the time it will erroneously 
report ok. If the widget is not blemished, how­
ever, the sensor will always report ok. 
Initially our robot believes there is a 0.3 chance that 
the widget is both flawed and blemished (that FL and 
BL are both true) and a 0.7 chance that it is neither 
flawed nor blemished. 
A classical planner cannot represent this problem , 
lacking the ability to represent the relative likeli­
hoods of the two possible initial states, the fact that 
the paint operator can sometimes fail, that the in­
spect operator provides information about the wid­
get rather than changing its state, and that this in­
formation can sometimes be incorrect. The proba­
bilistic planner BURIDAN [Kushmerick et a/., 1994a, 
Kushmerick et al., 1994b} (which cannot create con­
tingent plans), can build a plan with a success proba­
bility of at best 0.7: it assumes the widget will not be 
flawed, paints it, ships it, and notifies its supervisor. 
An information-gathering planner can generate a plan 
that works with probability . 97: it first senses the 
widget, then paints it. Then if the sensor reported 
ok, it ships the widget, otherwise it rejects it, fi­
nally notifying the supervisor. This plan fails only 
when the widget was initially flawed but the sensor 
erroneously reports ok, which occurs with probability 
(0.3)(0.1) = 0.03.1 
The c-BURIDAN planner generates this plan . We will 
describe the planner by developing this example, first 
presenting the action and plan representation, then de­
scribing a least�commitment planning algorithm that 
generates probably successful contingent plans. 
2 States, Actions, and Plans 
Here we present the formal definition of a state , an 
action, a plan, a planning problem, and what it means 
for a plan to solve a planning problem. 
Propositions and states. We begin by defi ning a 
set of domain propositions, each of which describes a 
particular aspect of the world . Domain propositions 
for our example are: 
FL-widget is flawed BL-widget is blemished 
PR-widget is processed PA-widget is painted 
NO-the supervisor is notified of success 
A domain proposition means that aspect of the world 
is true and a negated domain proposition, e.g. IT, 
means that aspect of the world is false. We use the 
term literal to refer to a domain proposition or its 
negation. 
A state is a complete description of the agent's model 
of the world at a particular point in time. Formally we 
define a state to be a set of literals in which every dO­
main proposition appears exactly once, either negated 
1 Actually a planner can generate an even better plan by 
sensing the part repeatedly or by executing paint multiple 
times. 
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or not.2 
In our example we know that initially the widget 
has not been processed or painted, and that there 
is as yet no error. But there is some chance it is 
both flawed and blemished and some chance it is nei­
ther. Thus there are two possible initial states; $1 = 
{ FL, BL, PR, PA, NO} and s2 =: { FL, BL, PR, PA, NO}. 
We will use s to refer to a random variable over states, 
and Sf the particular distribution over initial states. 
This random variable is defined as follows for our ex­
ample: (P[s1 = s1] = 0.3), (P[S:J = s2} = 0.7). 
Expressions. An expression refers to a conjunction 
of domain literals, which we represent by a set consist­
ing of those literals. The problem's goal is to have the 
part painted and processed, and supervisor notified­
the corresponding expression is g = {PA, PR, NO}. The 
probability that an expression is true in a state Is sim­
ply: 
P[£ Is) = { 1 if£ � s - 0 otherwise (1) 
(The probability is 1 if the literals in the expression 
are all present. in the state, 0 otherwise.) 
2.1 Actions and sequences 
An action describes the effects a plan operator has on 
the world when it is executed. Unlike action repre­
sentations in classical planners-in which an action's 
effects are unconditionally realized if the action's pre­
cond ition is true-the effects of our actions can depend 
both on the state in which the step is executed as well 
as random factors (not model�d in the state). 
Figure 1: A simple action . 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the paint action: if the 
widget has already been processed , paint has no effect; 
otherwise with probability 0.95 the widget will become 
painted and any blemishes removed and with proba­
bility 0.05 the action will not change the state of the 
world at alP 
We describe an action formally as a set of conse­
quences C;. Each consequence C; is a tuple of the form 
(7;, Pi,£;, o;), where T; is a set of domain propositions 
2We define states explicitly in terms of fully specified 
sets for the sake of formal exposition only-an implemen­
tation is not required to represent states this wa.y. In 
fact, our planning algorithm has no explicit representation 
of state, instead it reasons directly about the component 
propositions. 
3The leaves of the tree indicate changes to a state (like 
STRIPS adds and deletes.) 
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Figure 2: The ship and reject actions 
known as the consequence's trigger, p; is a probability, 
£i is a set of effects associated with the consequence, 
and o; is an observation label which will be explained 
below. The idea is that exactly one of an action's con­
sequences is actually realized when the action is exe­
cuted, and the effects of that consequence determine 
how the action changes the world. The representation 
for the paint action pictured in Figure 1 is 
pa'mt= { ( {PR}, 1.0, {} ), 
( {PR}, 0.95, {PA, BL} ), 
( {PR}, 0.05, {}) } 
The effects set is a set of literals which describe changes 
the action makes to the world. We define this formally 
by the function RES: if £ is an effect set and s is a 
state, 
REs(£,s) = (s\{p I p E £}) U£. (2) 
It is important to note that these effects describe the 
change an action makes to a state. The paint action 
cannot possibly make PA false, for example-if its {3 
or 'Y consequence occurs, it will not change the world 
at all. Whether a particular proposition is true after 
an action is executed can in general be computed only 
by examining both the action's effects and what state 
the proposition was in before the action was executed. 
An action defines a probabilistic transition from state 
to states: if s and w are states and A is an action, 
then 
P[wls,A] = P[T; Is]* p, (3) 
C,eA:w=RES(£;, s) 
Lw P[w Is, A) = 1 for all states s and all actions A 
which follows from the fact that ( 1) distinct. trigger 
expressions are mutually exclusive, so in any state ex­
actly one trigger expression will have proba.bili t.y 1 and 
the rest will have probability 0, and (2) all probabilities 
for each individual trigger expression must sum to 1. 
In other words, an action's consequences are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive. 
Figure 2 shows two more actions relevant to the ex­
ample: ship and reject. Ship successfully processes the 
widget if it is not flawed and not already processed. 
Reject processes the widget successfully if it is flawed 
and it has not already been processed. 
Action sequences. We will often reason about 
executing a sequence of actions-we will use 
{At, A2, ... , A,.) to mean executing At, then A2, and so 
on, and () indicates the execution of no actions. The 
probability distribution over states induced by execut-
ing a sequence of actions is defined as 
P[uls,{}] = 
{ � 
P[uls, (At. A2, ... ,An}]= 
if u =a 
otherwise 
L P[t Is, A1] x P[u It, (A2, ... , A,)] 
2.2 Information-producing actions 
(4) 
(5) 
The definition of actions-and the example actions 
presented so far-have been described in terms of the 
changes they make to the world when they are ex­
ecuted: paint usually makes PA true and makes BL 
false, for example. What about actions that are exe­
cuted for the information they provide? How does this 
action representation handle an operator that finds out 
whether the widget is painted (without actually paint­
ing it) or the inspect action that determines whether 
or not the widget is blemished {without either adding 
a blemish to or removing a blemish from it)? 
We cannot use the action's effects to model informa­
tion gathering: doing so would confuse the difference 
between the changes the action makes and the infor­
mation it provides, obscuring the difference between 
a plan that makes P true and a plan that determines 
whether P is true [Etzioni et al., 1992]. Instead we 
model the information produced by an action as a sep­
arate report provided to the agent when the action is 
executed. 
Figure 3: The inspect action provides information but 
ha� no material effects. 
We divide each action's consequences into a set of dis­
cernible equivalence classes (or DECs), and assign one 
report, or observation label, to each DEC. When the 
action is executed, the agent will receive the observa­
tion label corresponding to the DEC containing the 
consequence that was actually realized at execution 
time. The inspect action (Figure 3) has two DECs: 
the first consists of the action's a and (3 consequences, 
and generates the report ok; the second consists of 
the action's 'Y consequence, and generates the report 
bad.4 
The agent gets information from an observation label 
by making inferences about the world state, reason­
ing about what consequences of the action could have 
4Note that since all of its effect sets are empty, it will 
not change the world under any circumstances. 
generated that label. If executing inspect produces the 
label bad, for example, the agent knows that conse­
quence r occurred, and can be therefore be certain 
that BL was true when inspect was executed. If it gets 
the report ok, on the other hand, it knows that either 
a or f3 occurred, and so it cannot be certain about the 
state of BL 
The information generated by executing inspect is 
summarized by the following conditional probabilities: 
P[badiBL)::::: 0.9 
P[badiBLJ = 0.0 
P(okiBL] = 0.1 
P[okiBLJ = LO 
which is a standard probabilistic representation of a 
noisy evidence source (see, e.g., [Pearl, 1988, Chapter 
2]). 
The updated degree of belief in a proposition, con­
ditioned on receiving an observation, is computed a<:> 
a Bayesian update: suppose inspect is executed in 
the initial state (where PR is known to be false a.ncl 
P[BL] = 0.3), and the report ok is received: 
P[Bllok] = P[okiBL]P[BL] 
P[ok I BL]P[BL] + P [ ok I BI] P [BI] 
(0.1){0.3) 
(0.1)(0.3) + (1.0)(0.7) 
0.041 
We likewise can compute P[BL I bad]: 
P[BL[bad] P[bad I BL)P[BL] 
P[badl BL)P[BL] + P [bad IBI] P [BC) 
(0.9)(0.3) 
(0.9)(0.3) + (0.0)(0.7) 
1 .0 
The inspect action can also provide indirect evidence­
information about propositions other than BL. Since 
BL and FL are initially perfectly correlated in the ex­
ample, we have P[FL I BL] = 1 and therefore can con­
clude P[FL I bad] = 1 and P[FL I ok] = 0.041 as welL 
Executing paint destroys this correlation, however, so 
executing inspect after paint would not provide any ad­
ditional information about FL (but it still would about 
BL). Thus the information content of an action cannot 
be fully characterized by examining the action alone­
it depends on what probabilistic relationships hold in 
the plan at the time the action is executed. 
Executing an action that has exactly one DEC pro­
vides no additional information about the world: the 
agent knows that one of the consequences occurred, 
but does not know which one. (We omit the (single) 
observation label from the action's pictorial represen­
tation in such cases, e. g. paint, ship and reject.) 
We call an action information producing if it has more 
than one DEC, and causal if at least one of its effect 
sets is non-empty. Information-producing actions cor­
respond to the notions of a test or diagnostic. Our 
example actions are either causal but not informa­
tion producing (e.g. paint) or information producing 
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but not causal (inspect), but our representation allows 
causal and informational effects to be mixed. This 
functionality is crucial (and absent from many AI rep­
resentations of actions with informational effects) be­
cause a planner needs to be able to reason about both 
the benefits and the costs of gathering information 
about the world. In our representation the benefit of 
sensing is ascertained from the information it produces 
(its DECs) and the cost of sensing depends on the ac­
tion's triggers (what must be done to make the sensor 
operational) and its causal effects (what side effects 
are generated when the sensing action is executed and 
how they affect the rest of the plan). 
Figure 4: A sensory action with material effects. 
Figure 4 shows an example of an action with mixed 
causal and informational effects. Photo-blemish also 
detects blemishes, but does so by taking a flash pic­
ture. In order for it to take the picture it has to have 
a charged battery (BC). If the battery is charged the 
action provides perfect information about the state of 
BL, and as side effects it illuminates the room (IL) and 
discharges the battery (BC). This action can be used 
in a plan for a variety of purposes: if the planner can 
make sure that BC is true, executing the action pro­
vides perfect information about BL. The action also 
provides perfect information about BC and it could be 
used used to make IL true (or BC false) . The sensor 
could be costly if it is difficult to make BC true, or if 
making IL true has some adverse impact on the rest of 
the plan. 
Noisy actions. "Random noise" in the sensing pro­
cess is handled differently from noise in the effecting 
process: an effector that fails occasionally (and ran­
domly) is modeled by defining different consequences 
for the failure and success results. The two conse­
quences have the same trigger, therefore the distinc­
tion between the two consequences is made on the ba­
sis of the relative probabilities alone. A noisy sensor 
is modeled by attaching the same observation label to 
two or more consequences: inspect is a noisy sensor of 
BL because it can generate the observation label ok 
both when BL is true and when it is false. An ac­
tion can be a noisy effector but a perfect sensor, e.g. 
a pickup action might fail occasionally and probabilis­
tically, but it could provide perfect information about 
whether or not it succeeded. 
Independence assumptions. We assume that the 
conditional probabilities p; of action consequences are 
independent of one another, both in repeated execu-
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tion of the same action and execution of different ac­
tions. For example, if paint is executed twice (when PR 
is false) the probability that it will fail to make PA true 
(at least once) is 1 - .952 = .0975. Likewise , whether 
or not paint fails does not affect the conditional prob­
ability that inspect will fail to recognize a blemished 
part. Thus we assume that each consequence's condi­
tional probabilities are true with respect to the agent's 
world model, and we require that each action defini­
tion include all dependencies on modeled aspects of 
the world. For example , suppose that the paint ac­
tion is more likely to fail if the weather is humid. If 
humidity is not part of the agent's world model, the 
contribution of humidity to failure will be encoded in 
the conditional probability of the {3 consequence (see 
Figure 1). But if humidity is part of the agent's world 
model, then the paint action must explicitly represent 
this dependency (the consequences would be expanded 
to include the proposition designating humidity in the 
trigger conditions). 
2.3 Plan steps and contexts. 
A sensory action like inspect becomes useful when the 
planner can make the execution of other actions con­
tingent on the observation label generated by that sen­
sory action. To represent execution contingency, we 
define a plan step. Where an action defines the ef­
fect of an action in abstract, a plan step is a com­
ponent of a particular plan. A plan step is a pair: 
(action, context). The action is a<s described above, 
the context dictates the circumstances under which the 
step may be executed.5 A context is a conjunction of 
observation labels from previous steps in the plan; a 
step is executed only if its context matches the obser­
vations actually produced during execution. 
For example, suppose the agent wishes to execut.e this 
sequence of plan steps: 
((inspect,{}), 
(ship, {ok}}, 
(reject, {bad}}, 
{notify,{}) ) 
Suppose the agent executes the inspect step and re­
ceives the report bad. It next considers executing the 
second step in the sequence, but skips ship since that 
step's context does not match the report produced by 
execution of inspect. It does execute the third step, 
reject, since the step's context does match t.he report 
produced by inspect. The fourth step , notify, has an 
empty context so it is executed regardless of whether 
reject or ship was executed. In summary, the agent 
must keep track of the executwn context (the obset·va­
tion labels produced by the steps executed in the plan 
51n fact each step also needs a unique index, to allow 
multiple instances of the same action to appear in the plan, 
in particular allowing the observation labels of repeated 
actions to be distinguished. 
so far) , and execute plan steps only when their context 
matches the execution context. 
2.4 Planning problems and solutions 
Here we define the probability that a sequence of steps 
satisfies some goal expression (}. The definition is an 
extension of Equation 5 that takes into account each 
step's context and its relation to previously executed 
steps in the sequence. The effect of executing a step 
given an execution context is either (i) the effect of 
executing the corresponding action (if the contexts 
match) otherwise, (ii) no change. Executing an action 
has two effects: it changes the world state according 
to its consequences, and also adds an observation label 
to the execution context. 
Let ( be the execution context; it is a conjunction of 
the observation labels that have occurred so far in the 
plan. The context of step S, context(S), matches C if 
C 1- context(S). 
We first define the base case 
P[uiC,s,()J= { � if u = s otherwise (6) 
A non-executable step changes neither the distribution 
over states nor the execution context: 
P[u I C, s, (S1, S2, ... , Sn)J 
if C If context(S1) 
P[u I C, s, {S2, ... , Sn)J 
(7) 
Finally, if step 51 is executable in the current con­
text it changes both the probability distribution over 
states and the execution context, according to the con­
sequences C; = {T;, p;, £;, o;) of action(Sl): 
P[uiC,x,(S1,S2, ... ,Sn)] = 
L P[tt I (C A o,), REs(£,, s) , (S2, ... , Sn)} P[C; Is] 
c. 
if C f-- context(S!) (8) 
A planning algorithm produces a solution to a planning 
problem, both of which we will define now. 
A planning problem consists of: ( 1) a probability distri­
bution over initial states 51, (2) a goal expression (}­
a set (conjunction) of domain propositions describing 
the desired final state of the system, (3) a set of actions 
defining the agent's capabilities, and ( 4) a probability 
threshold r specifying a lower bound on the success 
probability for an acceptable plan. 
The planning algorithm produces a sequence of steps 
(51 , ... , S,.) as defined above. Such a sequence is a 
solution to the problem if the probability of the goal 
expression after executing the steps is at least equal to 
the threshold. The probability of goal satisfaction is 
defined from Equations ( 1) and (6)-(8): 
P[Qisi, {S1, ... , Sn)] = 
L P[Y I u]P[u IT, s, {S1, ... , Sn)] L P[sr ::= sJ (9) 
where T is the initial null (always true) execu­
tion context. A successful plan is a sequence 
of steps (St, ... , S,..) that satisfies the inequality 
P[glsi,{St, ... ,S,..)];::: T. 
This concludes the formal definition of the problem; 
next we describe a least-commitmen t  algorithm for 
solving it. 
3 Plans and planning 
Our planner takes a problem (initial probability dis­
tribution, goal expression, threshold, set of actions) as 
input and produces a solution sequence-a sequence of 
steps whose probability of achieving the goal exceeds 
the threshold. Here we describe its data structures 
and the algorithm it uses to produce a solution . A 
companion paper [Draper eta/., 1994] provides a more 
detailed description of the algorithm. 
Figure 5: The initial plan 
PR� 
a�
 
Initial and goal s teps. The planner initially con­
verts the problem's initial and goal states into two 
steps, initial and goal. The initial step codes the initial 
probability distribution, and the goal step has a single 
consequence with the goal state as its trigger. Figure 5 
shows initial and goal actions for the example. 
Plans. Following BURIDAN [Kushmerick et a/., 1993], 
the planner manipulates a data structure called a plan, 
consisting of a set of steps, ordering constraints over 
the steps, and a set of causal/inks. The initial and goal 
actions each appear exactly once in every plan, with 
the initial step ordered before all others and the goal 
step ordered after all others. A plan with only these 
two steps and this single ordering is called the initial, 
or null plan, and is the algorithm's starting point. 
Causal links. Causal links record decisions about 
the role the plan's steps play in achieving the goal. 
For example, the planner might create a link from the 
u consequence of a paint step to the PA trigger propo­
sition of the goal step, indicating that paint is sup­
posed to make PA true for use by goal. We will use 
the notation paint"'� goal to refer to this link. The 
consequence paint" is called the link's producer, PA is 
the link's proposition, and the step goal is the link's 
consumer. 
Subgoals. Subgoals are pairs of the form {p, Sj) 
which indicate that the probability of plan success 
might be increased by increasing the probability of p at 
Si . Initially, the triggers of goal (i.e. the propositions 
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of the goal expression) are subgoals. Thereafter, when 
a causal link 5;,-.E.Si is added to support a subgoal 
(p, sj)' the triggers of consequence L of S; are added to 
the set of subgoals. In other words, the subgoals are 
the propositions that participate in chains of causal 
links ending at the goal. (We will introduce another 
source of subgoals below.) 
Threats to links. The process of adding steps and 
links to the plan can generate conflicts. The presence 
of a link S;,-.E.Sj in a plan actually represents two com­
mitments on the planner's part: (1) to makeS; realize 
its consequence t, which will make p true, and (2) to 
keep p true from S; 's execution until Si 's execution. 
Therefore a threat to the link 5;,-.E.Sj is any step that 
(1) possibly occurs between S; and Sj and (2) has some 
consequence whose effect set contains p. 
Planning algorithm. The planning algorithm can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Begin with the null plan, containing only steps 
initial and goal, the ordering (initial< goal), and 
no causa.! links. 
2. Iterate: 
(a) Assess the current plan: compute the proba­
bility that the current plan achieves the goal. 
Report success if that probability is at least 
as great as the threshold. 
(b) Otherwise non deterministically choose a re­
finement to the current plan (reporting fail­
ure if there are no possible refinements), ap­
ply the refinement to the current plan, and 
repeat. 
Assessment. A plan defines a partial order over its 
steps, which in turn defines a set of legal execution 
sequences. One simple assessment algorithm iterates 
over all step sequences consistent with the plan's or­
dering constraints, calculating for each totally ordered 
sequence the set of states that could possibly occur 
and their associated probabilities (using the definition 
in Section 2.4), summing the probabilities of all states 
in which the goal is true. If it finds a sequence with 
success probability > T, it returns that sequence, oth­
erwise it returns failure. This simple version of plan as­
sessment is often quite inefficient. [Kushmerick et al., 
1993] compares the performance of four different as­
sessment algorithms, including the simple version de­
scribed here. One of the most interesting assessment 
algorithms uses the plan's causal links to estimate the 
success probability without actually enumerating any 
totally ordered sequences or reasoning explicitly about 
states. 
Refinement. A plan refinement adds structure to a 
pl an, trying to increase the probability that the plan 
will achieve its goal expression. The probability of goal 
achievement can be increased in one of two ways: 
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• if {p, Si) is a subgoal, then adding a new link from 
some (possibly new) plan step that makes p true 
might increase the probability that p is true at si ' 
and therefore might increase the success probabil­
ity, 
• if a causal link is currently part of the plan but 
some other step in the plan threatens the link ,  
then eliminating the threat might increase the 
probability of the link's consumer proposition , 
and therefore might increase the success proba­
bility. 
C-BURIDAN inherits all of BURIDAN 's refinement meth­
ods (discussed in [Kushmerick et al. ,  1993 , Draper et 
al. , 1994] ) .  We demonstrate them using the exam­
ple, then describe a new method of threat elimina­
tion,  branching, which introduces contingencies into 
the plan . 
Example. Recall that the example problem consists 
of an initial probability distribution over ( two) states 
and the goal expression {PR,  PA, NO } ,  the actions 
{paint, reject , ship, inspect} , and a success threshold of 
r = 0.8. The initial subgoals are the goal propositions: 
{ {PR, goal) , (PA , goal) , (NO, goal) } . 
The planner can build a non-contingent plan in eigh t 
refinement cycles starting from the i n i tial p lan (Fig­
ure 5). First, the paint step is added along with  a l i n k  
paint0 e8. goal, then paint0 ' s  trigger PR i s  supported 
using a link initial" f..apaint. Next the planner sup­
ports (PR, goal) by adding a ship step , l inking i ts n 
consequence to the goal, resulting i n  two new subgoals 
{FL, ship) and {PR, ship) , both of which can be l inked to 
the initial step's a consequence. The threat that. shi p  
poses to the link initialo m paint can then be resol ved 
by ordering paint before ship. Finally, the p lan ner adds 
a notify step and a link notifyti !ill. goa l ,  and supports 
notifyt� 's trigger PR with the link ship" 
PR notify. 
This plan-the best plan a non-contingent p lan ner 
could produce-will work just in case the widget is i n i­
tially not flawed and the paint step works, which trans­
lates into a success probability of (0 .7)(0 .95) = 0.665 . 
The success probability can be increased somewhat 
by adding additional paint steps to raise the proba­
bility that PA will be true, but withou t introd ucing 
information-producing actions and contingent execu­
tion, no planner can do better than 0.7. 
At this point a reasonable refinement would be to pro­
vide additional support for the subgoal (PR, goal} by 
adding a reject step and linking it to the goal . However 
this strategy introduces a pair of threats-reject makes 
PR true, threatening the link from in i tia l  to ship, and 
likewise ship makes PR true, threatening a link from 
initial to reject-which cannot be solved by adding ad­
ditional ordering constraints. We need a way to indi­
cate that only one of s h i p  or reject shou ld be executed.6 
6We have simplified this example s o  t h at b o t h  ship and 
Branching. Branching adds contexts to two plan 
steps that ensure that the two steps will never both 
be executable, and therefore that a threat between 
them will never actually materialize. There are three 
parts to resolving a threat by branching: (1) choose 
an information-producing step from the plan (or add 
a new one) and two disjoint subsets of its observation 
labels, (2) constrain the execution context of one of the 
threatening steps to occur only when a label from the 
first subset is generated and constrain the context of 
the other threatening step to occur only when a label 
from the second subset is generated, and (3) generate 
subgoals for all the triggers of the branching step. 
In the example, the planner chooses the information­
producing step inspect (adding it to the plan) and re­
stricts the execution context of ship to be ok and the 
execution context of reject to be bad. The triggers 
of inspect can be supported by links from the initial 
step. Now there is one more threat- the execution 
of inspect depends on the state of Bl, and the execu­
tion of paint changes the state of BL-which is easily 
resolved by ordering inspect before paint . The final 
plan , Figure 6 ,  has success probability .9215 (it will 
fail only if the paint step fails or if the widget was 
blemished and the inspect step incorrectly reports ok) 
so the planner terminates successfully. The resulting 
plan is :  first i nspect the widget, then paint it. If the 
inspection generated a report of ok then ship the wid­
get, otherwise reject it .  F inally, notify the supervisor. 
4 Concl usion and future work 
C-BURIDAN is an implemented algorithm for plan gen­
eration that models noisy sensors and effectors ac­
cording to a standard probabilistic interpretation, but 
also allows the actions to be manipulated by a sym­
bolic least-commitment planning algorithm. The plan­
refinement phase operates on the symbolic part of the 
action representation , linking (symbolic) action effects 
to (symbolic) subgoals. The plan-assessment phase 
treats the actions as probabilistic state transitions, 
compu ting a su ccess probability. 
The act ion representation properly distinguishes be­
tween an action 's causal and informational effects, al­
lowing the planner to discriminate between plans that 
make a proposition true from those that determine 
whether it is true [Etzioni et  al. , 1992]. The represen­
tation makes no arbitrary distinction between sensing 
actions and effecting actions, however: an action's ef­
fects can be both causal and information, and can be 
noisy in the changes it makes, the information it pro­
vides, both, or neither. The representation also allows 
indirect evidence from sensors to be considered. The 
plan representation exploits the informational effects 
reject can actually be executed, but if one succeeds the 
other will be a no-op. In [Draper et al., 1 993] we m ake ship 
and reject incompatible by making it an error to execute 
ship or reject when PR is true. 
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Figure 6 :  A successfu l plan p = .92 1 5  
o f  actions b y  causing execution o f  steps t o  b e  contin­
gent on the observations produced by the execution of 
previous (information-producing) steps. 
Related work. Related work can be found in 
the
_ 
literature on decision mak ing under uncertainty, 
�h1ch d�als with evaluat ing cont ingency pl ans with 
mformat10n-gathering actions [Winkler, 1 972], [1\I ath­
eson,  1990] . Also relevant are other symboli c  meth­
ods for p lan-generation under uncertainty [K ushmer­
ick et al. , 1 993] , [Mansell , 1993], [Goldman and Boddy, 
1994] , and deterministic conditional pl anners [Peot. 
and Smith, 1992] , [Pryor and Col l ins , 1993] . The 
longer paper discusses this work in more detai l .  
Recent work in p lanni ng under uncertainty , e . g. 
[Koenig,  1 992] and [Dean et al. , 1993], adopts a model 
based on fully observab le Markov processes , wh ich 
amounts to assuming that the planner is automatically 
provided with perfect i nformation about the world 
state every time it executes an action . This assump­
tion is directly opposed to our approach t.o the p rob­
lem, in which informat ion about the world i s  provided 
only when the agent acts to obtai n  it, and is  poten­
tially incorrect .  
Our model of action and information is equ i valent in 
expressive power to a partially observable M arkov de­
cision process (POMDP) [Monahan,  1982]. The prob­
lem we are solving is different from the one common ly 
addressed in that l iterature, however .  The PO M D P  
problem is generally posed as finding a policy that 
maximizes some value function over some p respec ified 
?orizon. The horizon is the number of t imes the pol i cy 
1s to be executed, and may be infinite. 
A policy is roughly analogous to our defi nition of a 
plan : both tell the agent what to do next based on its 
prior i n formation about the world and what observa­
t ions it has received from executing prior actions. It 
is also straightforward to build a value function that 
r:wards the agent just in case it satisfies a goal expres­
siOn . 
Our planning problem admits no clear notion of a pre­
specified horizon, however: t he agent executes the plan 
to completion , hoping to satisfy the goal. A horizon is 
a�nalogous to the nu mber of steps in a pl an our algo­
n thm generates , but it is not part of the input problem 
specification.  Further, we do not insist on a policy 
(plan) that maximizes the probability of goal satis­
faction , instead accepting any plan that is sufficiently 
likely to satisfy the goal. (Indeed in many cases a 
fin i te- lengt h probability-maximizing plan does not ex­
�st:  if an action fails probabilistically, one can always 
� ncrease t he probability of success by adding another 
mstance of that action to the plan . )  
A restaten1ent o f  our planning problem in the language 
of PO MOP would be "find a policy (with any horizon) 
that achieves an expected value of at least v" where v 
is some value threshold .  We know of no algorithms in 
the POMDP l iterature that address this problem. 
Future work. Future work will be directed in two 
areas : extending the expressive power of the action 
representation, and exploring methods for effectively 
generating cont ingent plans. The main limitation of 
the representation l anguage is the absence of any no­
tion of plan cost. C-BURIDAN gauges plan success by 
the probability of satisfying the goal, but [Haddawy 
and Hanks, 1 993] demonstrate the limitations of this 
model. In order to reason realistically about the cost 
and value of information , the action representation 
must be able to handle metric resources (like time, 
fuel , and money ) .  
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As a practical matter, C-BURIDAN can solve only very 
small problems. The search problem in  a probabil is­
tic planner is significantly worse than for a classical 
planner because the former has to consider the pos­
sibility of raising a subgoal's probabil ity by linking 
to it multiple times. Deciding when to branch and 
what sensing actions to use also causes computational 
problems. Ongoing research addresses the problem of 
how to represent and exploit effective heuristic search­
control knowledge. 
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